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Abstract
This paper studies optimal Public Private Partnerships contract between a public entity and
a consortium, in continuous-time and with a continuous payment, with the possibility for the
public to stop the contract. The public ("she") pays a continuous rent to the consortium ("he"),
while the latter gives a best response characterized by his effort. This effect impacts the drift
of the social welfare, until a terminal date decided by the public when she stops the contract
and gives compensation to the consortium. Usually, the public can not observe the effort done
by the consortium, leading to a principal agent’s problem with moral hazard. We solve this
optimal stochastic control with optimal stopping problem in this context of moral hazard. The
public value function is characterized by the solution of an associated Hamilton Jacobi Bellman
Variational Inequality. The public value function and the optimal effort and rent processes are
computed numerically by using the Howard algorithm. In particular, the impact of the social
welfare’s volatility on the optimal contract is studied.
Keywords: Moral Hazard, Public Private Partnership, stochastic control, optimal stopping,
Hamilton Jacobi Bellman variational inequality, Howard algorithm.
1 Introduction
Public-private partnership (PPP) is defined as a long-term contract between a private party
and a public entity, for the construction and/or the management of an asset or public service, in
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which the consortium takes the risks and a great responsibility to manage the project. Typically,
the consortium is making an effort to improve the social value of the project in exchange to a
rent payed by the public. The objective of PPP contracts is to ensure a better quality-price
ratio in the use of public funds. But a major problem of this type of contracts is the asymmetry
of information between the two parties, both in the negotiation and monitoring phases of the
project. In particular, the public can usually not observe the effort done by the consortium.
It is a principal agent’s problem with moral hazard. Numerous situations in the economic
literature lead to principal agent’s formulation. For example in Biais et al. [3], respectively in
Pagès and Possamai [16], the unobservable effort of the agent reduces the intensity of a Poisson
process describing the arrival of large losses, or respectively the default time of a pool of long
term loans.
The first paper on principal agent problems in continuous-time is the paper of Holmstrom
and Milgrom [12]. They considered a Brownian setting in which the agent controls the drift of
the output process, and receives a lumpsum payment at the end of the contract, that is a finite
time horizon. In their setting, the agent is risk averse and the principal is risk-neutral with
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion. Williams [22] and Cvitanic and Zhang [7] extended those
results to more general utility functions. In those situations, the optimal contract (character-
ized by the lumpsum payment) is a linear function of the output process terminal value. A
general theory, using coupled systems of Forward Backward Stochastic Differential Equations,
is developped in the monograph of Cvitanic and Zhang [8]. Still in a framework of a lumpsum
payment on a finite horizon, Cvitanic et al. [5, 6] considered a general formulation in which the
agents efforts impact both the drift and the volatility of the output process, using second-order
BSDE in a non Markovian stochastic control setting.
Nevertheless, due to the long maturity of PPP contracts (around 30 to 50 years), it seems
unreasonable to propose to the consortium a unique payment at the maturity of the contract.
For example, Hajjej et al. [11] derived the optimal perpetual contract (characterized by a
rent) using techniques of stochastic control under partial information. This paper proposes a
similar modeling with a continuous payment in random horizon, but adding the possibility of
stopping the contract at a fixed or a random time, decided by the public. This combines optimal
stochastic control and optimal stopping in this context of moral hazard. The seminal paper
of Sannikov [19] proposed a tractable model, in a continuous-time setting and with continuous
payment, to study the optimal contract and the optimal time of retiring/firing the agent. The
optimal contract is written as a function of the agent’s continuation value, which appears as
the state variable of the problem. Anderson et al. [1] studied the optimal replacement time
(either for the sake of incentive provision, or for the sake of growth) of managers operating
for a long-lived firm. Décamps and Villeneuve [10] studied the optimal strategic liquidation
time, in a framework where the firm’s profitability is impacted by the unobservable managerial
effort of the agent. In this setting the principal’s problem appears to be a 2-dimensional fully
degenerated Markov control problem and the optimal contract that implements full effort is
derived. Both papers [1] and [10] assume the agents and the principal to be risk neutral.
In this paper, we consider a contract between a public entity and a consortium, in a
continuous-time setting. The consortium is making effort to improve the social value of the
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project, driven by a one-dimensional Brownian motion. The effort is not observable by the pub-
lic, that must choose a continuous rent she will pay to the agent in compensation to his effort.
We assume that the effort only affects the drift and not the volatility of the social value. Indeed
in a one-dimensional setting, controlling the volatility would imply that the effort is observable,
through the quadratic variation of the social value. We also assume that the volatility of the
social value is known, contrary to the paper of Mastrolia and Possamai [15] in which the agent
and the principal faced both uncertainty on the volatility of the output. Our aim is to study
qualitatively the impact of the volatility parameter on the optimal contract. Since PPP are
contracts covering decades, our model tackles the possibility for the public to stop the contract
at a fixed or a random date. The public pays a rent to the consortium, while the latter gives
a best response characterized by his effort until an terminal date decided by the public when
she stops the contract and gives compensation to the consortium. We assume that the consor-
tium will accept the contract only if his expected payoff exceeds his reservation value x. As in
Sannikov [19], we assume that the agent is risk averse and that the principal is risk-neutral.
We consider a Stackelberg leadership model between the public and the consortium, that can
be solved in two steps. First, given a fixed contract, the public computes the best effort of the
consortium. Then, the public solves her problem by taking into account the best effort of the
consortium and computes the associated optimal contract.
As it is standard in the literature, we use the weak approach, that is the agent changes the
distribution of the social value of the project, by making the probability measure depend on
agent’s effort. Finally we characterize optimal contracts and we provide numerical solutions
using Howard algorithm.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the problem, using the weak
approach and we describe the public and the consortium problems. In Section 3, we determine
the incentive compatible contract and we provide the dynamics of the consortium objective
function, using the BSDE technique. In Section 4, we derive the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman
Variational Inequality associated to the public value function and we provide a verification
theorem. Section 5 is devoted mainly to the numerical study of the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman
Variational Inequality based on the Howard algorithm. Technical result on BSDE with random
horizon and the details of Howard’s algorithm are postponed in Appendix.
2 The Public Private Partnership model under moral haz-
ard
In this section, we work under the weak formulation as it is done usually in the principal-agent
literature. Let W be a standard one dimensional Brownian motion defined on a probability
space (Ω,P), and F = (Ft)t≥0 is the filtration generated by W (’satisfying the usual conditions
of right-continuity and completeness).
We introduce the social value of the project that is observed by the public
Xt := X0 + σWt, t ≥ 0 P a.s (2.1)
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where
• X0 > 0 is the initial value of the project.
• σ > 0 is the volatility of the operational cost of the infrastructure maintenance, that is
assumed to be constant.
Remark 2.1 We could take σ equal to 1 in (2.1). If σ ≡ 1, then X is the canonical process
defined on Ω the set of continuous paths starting from X0 and P is the Wiener measure on Ω.
In this paper, σ 6≡ 1 (the unit of time being the year) and we study numerically the sensitivity
of the value function, the optimal effort and the optimal rent to the volatility parameter σ.
In the weak formulation, the agent changes the distribution of the process X, by making
the underlying probability measure PA depend on agent’s effort A. We define the process
γA = (γAt )t≥0 by
γAt := exp
[∫ t
0
ϕ(As)
σ
dWs − 1
2
∫ t
0
(
ϕ(As)
σ
)2
ds
]
= E
[∫ t
0
ϕ(As)
σ
dWs
]
t ≥ 0 P a.s
where ϕ will be specified hereafter.
We denote by T the set of all finite F-stopping times and we consider
A := {(As)s≥0 F-progressively measurable process, As ≥ 0 ds⊗ dP a.e. such that
(γAt )t is a P martingale and sup
τ∈T
EP[(γAτ )p] <∞, ∀ p > 1}.
The probability measure PA is defined by dPA
dP |Ft = γAt for all t ≥ 0. Then, PA and P are
equivalent, by Girsanov’s Theorem, the process (WAt )t≥0 defined by
WAt = Wt −
∫ t
0
ϕ(As)
σ
ds, for t ≥ 0
is a PA-Brownian motion and the social value of the project is given by:
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
ϕ(As)ds+ σW
A
t , t ≥ 0 P a.s. (2.2)
Remark 2.2 For a fixed T and a bounded function ϕ, the Novikov condition is satisfied and
(γAt )0≤t≤T is a martingale and (WAt )0≤t≤T is a Brownian motion (see Theorem 42, Chapter 3
in Protter [20]). In our case, ϕ is assumed to be bounded (see Assumption 2.4) but the horizon
is only finite.
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The public observes the social value X of the project, but she does not observe directly the
effort of the consortium: this a situation of moral hazard. She chooses the rent she will pay to
the consortium to compensate him for his efforts and the operational costs that he supports.
The public could end the contract at the date τ , where τ is a stopping time in T .
A contract is a triplet Γ = ((Rt)t, τ, ξ) where R is a non-negative F-progressively measurable
process, τ ∈ T , and ξ is a non negative Fτ -mesurable random variable which represents the
cost of stopping the contract.
Remark 2.3 Contrary to a strong formulation (cf. Hajjej et al. [11]), the filtrations FX and
F coincide in the weak formulation, where FX is the filtration generated by the social value
process X and F is the Brownian filtration generated by the standard Brownian motion W .
We now define the respective optimization problems for the consortium and the public. Let us
first define the functions involved in the formulation of the optimization problems:
Assumption 2.4 • ϕ is the function that models the marginal impact of the consortium’s
efforts on the social value, ϕ is C2 strictly concave, bounded, increasing, ϕ > 0 and
‖ϕ‖∞
σ
< 1, ϕ′(0) > 0.
• U : [0,∞[→ [0,∞[ is the utility function of the consortium, strictly concave increasing
and satisfying Inada’s conditions U ′(∞) = 0, U ′(0) =∞.
• h is the cost of the effort for the consortium; h is C2, strictly convex increasing, h(0) = 0.
• The time preference parameter λ of the consortium is greater than δ the one of the public
(λ ≥ δ): the consortium is more impatient than the public.
We assume that given a contract Γ = ((Rs)s, τ, ξ) offered by the principal, the consortium gives
a best response in terms of an effort process A: this is a Stackelberg leadership model. The
consortium accepts the contract only if his expected payoff exceeds his reservation value x.
1. Agent’s best response
A∗ ∈ arg max
A∈AC
EA
[∫ τ
0
e−λs(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+ e−λτξ
]
if it exists (see Lemma 3.4 for the proof of the existence), where
AC := {(As)s≥0 ∈ A, such that EP[
∫ ∞
0
e−λs|h(As)|pds] <∞,
EP[
∫ ∞
0
e−δs|ϕ(As)|pds] <∞ ∀p > 1}.
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The objective function starting at time t for the consortium is PA-a.s.
JCt (Γ, A) := EA
[∫ τ
t
e−λ(s−t)(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+ e−λ(τ−t)ξ|Ft
]
.
As the process (JCt (Γ, A))0≤t≤τ , is continuous and PA ∼ P, we have
JCt (Γ, A) := EA
[∫ τ
t
e−λ(s−t)(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+ e−λ(τ−t)ξ|Ft
]
, ∀t ∈ [[0, τ ]] P a.s. (2.3)
2. Given the best response of the agent the principal problem is formulated by
sup
Γ∈AP
sup
PA∗∈P
EA∗
[∫ τ
0
e−δs(ϕ(A∗s)−Rs)ds− e−δτξ
]
(2.4)
subject to the reservation constraint
EA∗
[∫ τ
0
e−λs(U(Rs)− h(A∗s))ds+ e−λτξ
]
≥ x
where
AP := {((Rs)s≥0, τ, ξ) such that R F-progressively measurable process Rs ≥ 0 ds⊗ dP a.e.
and ∀p ≥ 1, EP[
∫ ∞
0
e−δs(Rs)pds] <∞, τ ∈ T , ξ Fτ -measurable such that
EP(e−λτξ)2 <∞}, (2.5)
and
P =
{
PA∗ ∼ P, A∗ ∈ arg max
A∈AC
EA
[∫ τ
0
e−λs(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+ e−λτξ
]}
.
The objective function starting at time t for the public is PA∗-a.s.
JPt (Γ, A
∗) := EA∗
[∫ τ
t
e−δ(s−t)(ϕ(A∗s)−Rs)ds− e−δ(τ−t)ξ|Ft
]
.
Using the same arguments as in (2.3), we have
JPt (Γ, A
∗) := EA∗
[∫ τ
t
e−δ(s−t)(ϕ(A∗s)−Rs)ds− e−δ(τ−t)ξ|Ft
]
, ∀t ∈ [[0, τ ]] P a.s. (2.6)
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3 Incentive compatible contracts
The aim of this section is to determine the incentive compatible contracts and to provide the
dynamics of the consortium objective function JC . To achieve this, one first needs to prove an
existence and uniqueness result for a certain type of BSDE with random horizon.
As we will see later, the objective function for the agent is related to the solution of the following
BSDE with a random time horizon τ
Yt = ζ +
∫ τ
t
g(s, ω, Zs)ds−
∫ τ
t
ZsdWs, (3.1)
where the generator g : R+×Ω×R→ R does not depend on Y (it will be specified hereafter).
BSDEs with random horizon have been studied by some authors. Chen [4] considered a random
horizon which could be infinite and assumed that the constant of Lipschitz of the generator
is time-dependent and square integrable on [0,∞]: this assumption is not satisfied in our case,
since the Lipschitz coefficient is constant. Darling and Pardoux [9] studied a BSDE with random
horizon. They assumed that the generator depends on (y, z). Applying their results in our
context would force us to assume strong integrability assumptions on the terminal condition ζ,
namely E[|eρτζ|2] <∞, for a ρ > 1
2
(‖ϕ‖∞
σ
)2. Recently, Lin et al. [14] weakened this assumption.
They assumed that E[|eρτζ|2] <∞, for a ρ > 0 in our setting, which remains stronger than the
condition E[|ζ|2] < ∞. That is why we need to prove another existence result adapted to our
situation. To do this, we assume that:
(H1) g(., ., z) is a progressively measurable process in R for each z ∈ R and
E
[∫ τ
0
|g(s, w, 0)|2ds
]
<∞.
(H2) g satisfies the following contraction condition, i.e. there exist a constant 0 ≤ c < 1 such
that for any s, w, z1 and z2
|g(s, w, z1)− g(s, w, z2)| ≤ c|z1 − z2| ds⊗ dP a.s.
We introduce the following spaces for a fixed stopping time τ ∈ T :
S2(τ) : = {Y F-progressively measurable process such that
||Y ||S2(τ) :=
(
EP
[
sup
0≤s≤τ
|Ys|2
]) 1
2
<∞},
H2(τ) : = {Z F-progressively measurable process such that
||Z||H2(τ) :=
(
EP
[∫ τ
0
|Zs|2ds
]) 1
2
<∞},
L2(Fτ ) : = {ζ Fτ -measurable random variable such that E[|ζ|2] <∞}.
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The existence and uniqueness of a solution to the BSDE (3.1) is given in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 3.1 Let τ be a stopping time in T , ζ ∈ L2(Fτ ) and let g satisfy (H1) and (H2),
then:
1. There exists a unique solution (Y, Z) ∈ S2(τ)×H2(τ) to the BSDE (τ, ζ, g) (3.1).
2. Comparison theorem: if (Y, Z) (resp. (Y ′, Z ′)) is the solution of the BSDE (τ, ζ, g)
(resp. BSDE (τ, ζ, g′)) with generators satisfying (H1) and (H2), and g(t, w, Zt) ≤
g′(t, w, Zt), t ∈ [[0, τ ]], dt⊗ dP a.e. Then
Yt ≤ Y ′t for all t ∈ [[0, τ ]] P a.s.
The proof is postponed in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.1 is used to determine the incentive compatible contract and to provide the
dynamics of the consortium objective function. This will be particularly useful in what follows
to reformulate the optimization problems in terms of the consortium objective function JC
(instead of X).
Lemma 3.2 Suppose Assumption 2.4. For any admissible contract Γ ∈ AP , and for any
A ∈ AC, there exists ZA ∈ H2(τ) such that the dynamics of the consortium objective function
evolves according to the BSDE with random terminal condition
dJCt (Γ, A) =
[
λJCt (Γ, A)− U(Rt)− ψ(At, ZAt )
]
dt+ ZAt dWt, J
C
τ (Γ, A) = ξ (3.2)
where
ψ(a, z) := −h(a) + zϕ(a)
σ
. (3.3)
If there exists A∗ ∈ AC such that ψ(At, ZAt ) ≤ ψ(A∗t , ZAt ), ∀t ∈ [[0, τ [[ P a.s, then
JCt (Γ, A) ≤ JCt (Γ, A∗t ), ∀t ∈ [[0, τ [[ P a.s.
Proof: For any admissible contract Γ ∈ AP , for any A ∈ AC and for any t ∈ [[0, τ [[, we define
the integrable process
MCt (Γ, A) : = e
−λtJCt (Γ, A) +
∫ t
0
e−λs(U(Rs)− h(As))ds
= EPA
[∫ τ
0
e−λs(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+ e−λτξ|Ft
]
=
1
γAt
EP
[
γAτ
∫ τ
0
e−λs(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+ γAτ e−λτξ|Ft
]
,
where the last equality is obtained using Bayes formula.
As (EP
(
γAτ (
∫ τ
0
e−λs(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+ e−λτξ)|Ft
)
is a (P, F)-martingale, by the martingale
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representation theorem, there exists a F-progressively measurable process χ such that: 1
MCt (Γ, A) =
1
γAt
(
MC0 (Γ, A) +
∫ t
0
χsdWs
)
.
Thus d(γAt MCt (Γ, A)) = χtdWt, using Itô’s formula, we obtain
MCt (Γ, A) = M
C
0 (Γ, A) +
∫ t
0
(
χs
γAs
−MCs (Γ, A)
ϕ(As)
σ
)dWAs .
Then denoting ZAs = eλs(
χs
γAs
−MCs (Γ, A)ϕ(As)σ ) ds⊗ dP a.e, we deduce
e−λtJCt (Γ, A) = M0(Γ, A)−
∫ t
0
e−λs(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+
∫ t
0
e−λsZAs dW
A
s ,
and we obtain
dJCt (Γ, A) =
(
λJCt (Γ, A)− U(Rt) + h(At)
)
dt+ ZAt dW
A
t ,
which implies that under P
dJCt (Γ, A) =
(
λJCt (Γ, A)− (U(Rt)− h(At))− ZAt
ϕ(At)
σ
)
dt+ ZAt dWt, J
C
τ (Γ, A) = ξ.
The associated Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (BSDE (R, τ, ξ) in short) is given by{
dYt =
(
λYt − U(Rt)− ψ(At, ZAt )
)
dt+ ZAt dWt
Yτ = ξ
(3.4)
where
ψ(At, Z
A
t ) = −h(At) + ZAt
ϕ(At)
σ
.
Considering the discounted quantities
(Y˜t, Z˜
A
t ) = (e
−λtYt, e−λtZAt ), t ∈ [[0, τ [[ P a.s,
(Y˜ , Z˜A) satisfies the BSDE{
dY˜t =
(
−U˜(Rt)− ψ˜(At, Z˜At )
)
dt+ Z˜At dWt,
Y˜τ = e
−λτξ,
(3.5)
where {
ψ˜(At, Z˜
A
t ) = −e−λth(At) + Z˜At ϕ(At)σ ,
U˜(Rt) = e
−λtU(Rt).
(3.6)
1It is important to work under the probability measure P and not PA. Indeed, although the inclusion
FA = σ(WA) ⊆ F holds, the reverse inclusion is not true in general case (see the Tsirel’son’s example in [23]).
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The generator of the BSDE (3.5) depends only on Z˜A and is defined by g(t, r, z) := −U˜(r) −
ψ˜(a, z). g : R+×Ω×R→ R satisfies (H1) (since ϕ is bounded and refering to the definition of
the set AC) and (H2) (g satisfies the contraction condition with constant c = ‖ϕ‖∞
σ
< 1). Then
from Proposition 3.1, there exists a unique (Y˜ , Z˜A) ∈ S2(τ) ×H2(τ) solving the BSDE (3.5).
Therefore, there exists a unique (Y, ZA) solving the BSDE (3.4) such that(
EP
[
sup
0≤s≤τ
|e−λsYs|2
]) 1
2
<∞ and
(
EP
[∫ τ
0
|e−λsZAs |2ds
]) 1
2
<∞.
From the definition of A∗, we have
ψ˜(At, Z˜
A
t ) ≤ ψ˜(A∗t , Z˜At ), ∀t ∈ [[0, τ [[ P a.s.
By the comparison theorem (see Proposition 3.1), we have
JCt (Γ, A) ≤ JCt (Γ, A∗), ∀t ∈ [[0, τ [[ P a.s. (3.7)
•
Lemma 3.3 For any Γ ∈ AP and A∗ the best response (if it exists), we have
U(Rt)− h(A∗t ) ≥ 0, dt⊗ dP a.e.
Proof: Let Γ ∈ AP and A∗ the best response. We fix ε > 0 and ω ∈ Ω. By definition
of JC(Γ, A∗), there exists Aε,ω ∈ AC , which is an ε-optimal control for JCτ ′(Γ, A∗), for all τ ′
stopping time, τ ≥ τ ′, a.s, i.e.
JCτ ′(ω)(Γ, A
∗)(ω)− ε ≤ JCτ ′(ω)(Γ, Aε,ω)(ω). (3.8)
By definition of JC0 , from the comparison theorem (see Proposition 3.1), we have for any A ∈ AC
JC0 (Γ, A
∗)
≥ JC0 (Γ, A) = EA
[∫ τ
0
e−λs(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+ e−λτξ
]
≥ EA
[∫ τ ′
0
e−λs(U(Rs)− h(As))ds
]
+ EA
[
e−λτ
′
EA
[∫ τ
τ ′
e−λ(s−τ
′)(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+ e−λ(τ−τ ′)ξ
)]
= EA
[∫ τ ′
0
e−λs(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+ e−λτ ′JCτ ′(Γ, A)
]
.
We fix A ∈ AC and we define the process
Âs(ω) =
{
As(ω), s ∈ [[0, τ ′(ω)]],
Aε,ωs (ω), s ∈]]τ ′(ω), τ ]].
10
We can show by the measurable selection theorem (see. Chapter 7 in Bertsekas and Shreve [2])
that the process Â is progressively measurable. By using again the law of iterated conditional
expectation, Bayes formula and from (3.8), we get
JC0 (Γ, A
∗) ≥ JC0 (Γ, Â) = EÂ
[∫ τ ′
0
e−λs(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+ e−λτ ′JCτ ′(Γ, Aε,ω)
]
= E
[∫ τ ′
0
γÂs e
−λs(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+ γÂτ ′e−λτ
′
JCτ ′(Γ, A
ε,ω)
]
= E
[∫ τ ′
0
γAs e
−λs(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+ γAτ ′e−λτ
′
JCτ ′(Γ, A
ε,ω)
]
≥ EA
[∫ τ ′
0
e−λs(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+ e−λτ ′JCτ ′(Γ, A∗)
]
− ε.
Let ε go to 0, we obtain the inequality:
JC0 (Γ, A
∗) ≥ EA
[∫ τ ′
0
e−λs(U(Rs)− h(As))ds+ e−λτ ′JCτ ′(Γ, A∗)
]
. (3.9)
We consider then the set
Cτ ′,R,A∗ := {(s, ω) ∈ [0, τ ′]× Ω, such that U(Rs)− h(A∗s) < 0}.
If Leb ⊗ P(Cτ ′,R,A∗) > 0, where Leb denotes the Lebesgue measure, then the choice of control
A
′∗
s = h
−1 ◦ (U(Rs)) on Cτ ′,R,A∗(Z) and A′∗s = A∗s on Ccτ ′,R,A∗ increases the criteria given in (3.9),
which is in contradiction with the comparison theorem. Therefore, the effort A∗ satisfies
U(Rs)− h(A∗s) ≥ 0, ds⊗ dP a.e.
•
Lemma 3.4 Suppose Assumption 2.4. Let z be a real number. We define, A∗(z) := arg max
a≥0
ψ(a, z).
If z > σ h
′(0)
ϕ′(0) , then A
∗(z) = ( h
′
ϕ′ )
−1( z
σ
) and if z ≤ σ h′(0)
ϕ′(0) , then A
∗(z) = 0.
Moreover, A∗ is a bijection from {0} ∪ (σ h′
ϕ′ (0),∞) to [0,∞).
Proof: We fix z ∈ R. Under Assumption 2.4, for all a ≥ 0, ( h′
ϕ′ )
′
(a) =
h′′(a)ϕ′(a)− ϕ′′(a)h′(a)
(ϕ′(a))2
>
0, this shows that h′
ϕ′ is invertible from [0,∞) into [ h
′(0)
ϕ′(0) ,∞).
First case: z > σ h
′(0)
ϕ′(0) : The function ψ is stritly concave, the first-order necessary condition of
optimality ∂ψ
∂a
(A∗(z), z) = 0 is sufficient and is equivalent to
z = σ
h′(A∗(z))
ϕ′(A∗(z))
. (3.10)
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Thus A∗ is a bijection from (σ h′
ϕ′ (0),∞) to [0,∞).
Second case: 0 < z ≤ σ h′(0)
ϕ′(0) : then Equation (3.10) is not well defined. The optimum could not
be positive. In the neighborhood of 0, the function ψ must be decreasing, otherwise A∗(z) = 0
is not a maximum. The necessary condition of optimality ∂ψ
∂a
(0, z) = −h′(0) + z ϕ′(0)
σ
≤ 0 is
satisfied in 0. As the function ψ is strictly concave, the latter condition is sufficient. This shows
that A∗(z) = 0
Third case: z ≤ 0: The function ψ(z, .) is decreasing in a and so A∗(z) = 0. In particular,
A(0) = 0, and so Lemma 3.4 is proved. •
It is important to study conditions under which a bijection between (A∗t )t≥0 and (ZAt )t≥0 holds.
Proposition 3.5 Let Γ ∈ AP and A ∈ AC . There exists a bijection between the process
(ZAt )t≥0 and the optimal effort (A∗t )t≥0, the bijection is given by
A∗t = A
∗(ZAt ) = (
h′
ϕ′
)−1(
ZAt
σ
)1{ZAt >0},
or
ZAt = (σ
h′
ϕ′
)(A∗(ZAt ))1{A∗(ZAt )>0}.
Proof: We consider the stochastic set D = {(t, ω), A∗t (ω) > 0}. From Lemma 3.4, we have
ZAt = σ
h′(A∗t )
ϕ′(A∗t )
. As h and ϕ are increasing (see Assumption 2.4), (ZAt )t≥0 is a positive process.
The function h′
ϕ′ being invertible gives a bijection between Z
A
t and A∗t .
Now we consider DC := {(t, ω), A∗t (ω) = 0}. On this set, from Lemma 3.4, we have ZAt ≤ σ h
′(0)
ϕ′(0) .
By Lemma 3.3, we have U(Rt) ≥ h(0) = 0 which implies that Rt ≥ U−1(0) = 0. From
the definition of the objective function for the public, R∗t = 0 on DC . For (t, ω) ∈ DC , the
consortium does not give any effort and does not receive any rent from the public and we have
dJCt (R
∗, τ, ξ, A∗) =
[
λJCt (R
∗, τ, ξ, A∗)− Z
A∗
t
σ
ϕ(A∗t )
]
dt+ ZA
∗
t dWt
= λJCt (R
∗, τ, ξ, A∗)dt.
The uniqueness of the BSDE’s solution implies ZA∗t = 0 a.s. This shows A∗t = A∗(ZAt ) =
( h
′
ϕ′ )
−1(Z
A
t
σ
)1{ZAt >0}. •
Remark 3.6 In Sannikov [19] ZA is assumed to be bounded below by γ0 = U ′(C) where C is
the upper bound of the rent. In our case, the lower bound for ZA is zero. This is coherent with
Sannikov [19], since in our case C =∞ and U ′(∞) = 0.
Proposition 3.7 Suppose Assumption 2.4. The dynamics of JC for any incentive compatible
contract (Γ, A∗(Z)) is given by the BSDE with random terminal condition
dJCt (Γ, A
∗(Z)) =
(
λJCt (Γ, A
∗(Zt))− U(Rt)− ψ(A∗(Zt), Zt)
)
dt+ ZtdWt, J
C
τ (Γ, A
∗(Z)) = ξ
(3.11)
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where A∗(Z) is defined in Lemma 3.4.
Remark 3.8 We will rather write Equation (3.11) in the integral form
JCt (Γ, A
∗(Z)) = ξ −
∫ τ
t
(
λJCs (Γ, A
∗(Z))− U(Rs)− ψ(A∗(Zs), Zs)
)
ds−
∫ τ
t
ZsdWs.
Proof: We fix Γ ∈ Ap. For any A ∈ AC , we have
JCt (Γ, A) ≤ JCt (Γ, A∗(ZA)), ∀t ∈ [[0, τ [[ P a.s
where ZA is defined in Lemma 3.2. Applying the martingale representation theorem to
(JCt (Γ, A
∗(ZA))t≥0 as in Lemma 3.2, there exists a progressively measurable process (Z
A∗(ZA)
t )t
such that:
dJCt (Γ, A
∗(ZA)) =
(
λJCt (Γ, A
∗(ZA))− U(Rt) + h(A∗(ZAt ))− ZA
∗(ZA)
t
ϕ(A∗(ZAt ))
σ
)
dt
+ Z
A∗(ZA)
t dWt,
JCτ (Γ, A
∗(ZA)) = ξ.
Besides, (JCt (Γ, A∗(ZA)))t solves the BSDE
dYt =
(
λYt − U(Rt) + h(A∗(ZAt ))− ZAt
ϕ(A∗(ZAt ))
σ
)
dt+ ZAt dWt,
Yτ = ξ.
From the uniqueness of the solution of the last BSDE, we have
ZAt = Z
A∗(ZA)
t , ∀t ∈ [[0, τ [[ P a.s,
which implies from Lemma 3.4
A∗(ZAt ) = A
∗(ZA
∗(ZA)
t ), ∀t ∈ [[0, τ [[ P a.s.
This allows to omit the dependence of A in ZA. Inequality (3.7) implies that
JCt (Γ, A) ≤ JCt (Γ, A∗(Z)), ∀t ∈ [[0, τ [[ P a.s.
•
We now reformulate the stochastic control problem with JC as state variable and the con-
tract Γ and the best effort A∗(Z) as control processes. Usually in the literature (see Sannikov
[19] and Cvitanic et al. [6]), the optimization problem consists in maximizing a certain criterion
where the control variables are given by Γ and (Zt)t≥0 which is a standard mixed stopping-
regular stochastic control problem. In this paper, we keep the explicit control (A∗(Zt))t≥0
instead of (Zt)t≥0, since (A∗(Zt))t≥0 represents a physical quantity and thus it is more quantifi-
able and interpretable than the control (Zt)t≥0 which is a diffusion coefficient.
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4 Hamilton Jacobi Bellman variational inequality
From now on, we adopt a forward point of view for the dynamics of the consortium objective
function which evolves according to the following forward SDE
dJCt (x,R, τ, A
∗(Z)) =
(
λJCt (x,R, τ, A
∗(Z))− U(Rt) + h(A∗(Zt))− Ztϕ(A
∗(Zt))
σ
)
dt+ ZtdWt,
JC0 (x,R, τ, A
∗(Z)) = x. (4.1)
Using the characterization of the incentive compatible contracts, the optimization problem of
the public can be written as a standard stochastic control problem. The state process is the
consortium objective function JC whose dynamics is given by (4.1). The control processes are
given by R, τ and A∗(Z) ∈ AC , and the value function given by (2.4) is formulated as:
v(x) := sup
(R,τ,A∗(Z))∈Y
EA∗(Z)x
[∫ τ
0
e−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs)ds− e−δτJCτ (x,R, τ, A∗(Z))
]
, (4.2)
where EA
∗(Z)
x is the conditional expectation with respect to the initial event {JC0 (x,R, τ, A∗(Z)) =
x} and
Y :=
{
(R, τ, A∗(Z)) R ≥ 0 F-progressively measurable process such that
EP[
∫ ∞
0
e−δs(Rs)pds] <∞∀p > 1, τ ∈ T , A∗(Z) ∈ AC
}
. (4.3)
The set
S := {x ≥ 0 : v(x) ≤ −x}
is called the stopping region and is of particular interest: whenever the state is in this region,
it is optimal to stop the contract immediately. Its complement Sc is called the continuation
region.
We apply the dynamic programming principle, which takes the following form: for all stopping
time η ∈ T , we have
v(x) = sup
(R,τ,A∗(Z))∈Y
EA
∗(Z)
x
[∫ τ∧η
0
e−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs)ds− e−δτJCτ (x,R, τ,A∗(Z))1τ<η
+ e−δηv(JCη (x,R, τ,A
∗(Z)))1η≤τ
]
, (4.4)
which is used to derive the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Variational Inequality (HJBVI) associated
to the value function
min
{
δw(x)− sup
(r,a)∈R+×R+
[La,rw(x) + ϕ(a)− r], w(x) + x
}
= 0, x ∈ (0,∞), (4.5)
where the second order differential operator La,r is defined by
La,rw(x) := 1
2
(σ
h′(a)
ϕ′(a)
)21{a>0}w”(x) + [λx− U(r) + h(a)]w′(x).
The first step consists in giving the boundary condition.
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4.1 The boundary condition
Lemma 4.1 gives the boundary condition v(0).
Lemma 4.1 The function v defined in (4.2) satisfies
v(0) = max
{
1
δ
sup
y≥0
{ϕ ◦ h−1 ◦ U(y)− y}, 0
}
. (4.6)
Proof:
The proof is divided into two steps.
Step 1: We prove that
v(0) ≥ max
{
1
δ
sup
y≥0
{ϕ ◦ h−1 ◦ U(y)− y}, 0
}
. (4.7)
For fixed n ∈ N, we consider the controls (R, n,A∗(Z)) ∈ Y , where Y is defined by (4.3). We
define
V̂ (0) := sup
(R,n,A∗(Z))∈Y
EA∗(Z)
[∫ n
0
e−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs)ds
]
.
We have v(0) ≥ V̂ (0) since the value function V̂ maximizes the same criteria as v, but on a
smaller set. By (4.2), v(0) ≥ 0, so, we have
v(0) ≥ max(V̂ (0), 0).
It remains to show that
V̂ (0) ≥ sup
y≥0
1
δ
{ϕ ◦ h−1 ◦ (U(y)− y}.
Since the public is the leader, she could propose a rent R¯0 to the consortium, where R¯0 realizes
the maximum on R+ of the function r → ϕ ◦ h−1 ◦ U(r)− r.
We have to prove that A¯0 := h−1 ◦ U(R¯0) maximizes the consortium objective function, condi-
tionally on the event {JC0 (Γ, A∗(Z)) = 0}, where Γ = (R¯0, n):
0 = sup
A∈AC
E
[∫ n
0
e−λs(U(R¯0)− h(As))ds
]
=
1− e−λn
λ
U(R¯0) + sup
A∈AC
E
[∫ n
0
−e−λsh(As)ds
]
=
1− e−λn
λ
U(R¯0)− inf
A∈AC
E
[∫ n
0
e−λsh(As)ds
]
thus
inf
A∈AC
E
[∫ n
0
e−λsh(As)ds
]
=
1− e−λn
λ
U(R¯0). (4.8)
As h(A¯0) = U(R¯0) and by (4.8), we have
1− e−λn
λ
U(R¯0) = inf
A∈AC
E
[∫ n
0
e−λsh(As)ds
]
≤ E
[∫ n
0
e−λsh(A¯0)ds
]
=
1− e−λn
λ
U(R¯0).
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Therefore
E
[∫ n
0
e−λsh(A¯0)ds
]
= inf
A∈AC
E
[∫ n
0
e−λsh(As)ds
]
.
Consequently, A¯0 is the consortium best response to the contract (R¯0, n). From the definition
of R¯0
V̂ (0) ≥ EA¯0
[∫ n
0
e−δs(ϕ ◦ h−1 ◦ U(R¯0)− R¯0)ds
]
= sup
y≥0
{ϕ ◦ h−1 ◦ U(y)− y}
∫ n
0
e−δsds
= sup
y≥0
{ϕ ◦ h−1 ◦ U(y)− y}1− e
−δn
δ
.
Sending n to infinity, we get
V̂ (0) ≥ sup
y≥0
1
δ
{ϕ ◦ h−1 ◦ U(y)− y}
which proves (4.7).
Step 2. To prove the converse inequality, we introduce bϕ,h,U := sup
y≥0
{ϕ ◦h−1 ◦U(y)− y} which
is finite since the function ϕ ◦ h−1 ◦ U(r) is concave. Recall also that
v(0) = sup
(R,τ,A∗(Z))∈Y
EA
∗(Z)
0
[∫ τ
0
e−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs)ds− e−δτJCτ (0, R, τ, A∗(Z))
]
where EA
∗(Z)
0 is the conditional expectation with respect to the event {JC0 (0, R, τ, A∗(Z)) = 0}.
We have
v(0) ≤ b
ϕ,h,U
δ
+ sup
(R,τ,A∗(Z))∈Y
EA
∗(Z)
0
[∫ τ
0
e−δs
(
ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs − bϕ,h,U
)
ds
]
+ sup
τ∈T
EA
∗(Z)
0
[
e−δτ (−JCτ (0, R, τ, A∗(Z))−
bϕ,h,U
δ
)
]
.
(4.9)
On the one hand, by Lemma 3.3, U(Rs)− h(A∗(Zs)) ≥ 0, thus by monotonicity of ϕ ◦ h−1
ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs ≤ ϕ ◦ h−1 ◦ U(Rs)−Rs, ds⊗ dP a.e.,
which implies
sup
(R,τ,A∗(Z))∈Y
EA∗(Z)
[∫ τ
0
e−δs
(
ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs − bϕ,h,U
)
ds
]
≤ sup
(R,τ,A∗(Z))∈Y
EA∗(Z)
[∫ τ
0
e−δs(ϕ ◦ h−1 ◦ U(Rs)−Rs − bϕ,h,U)ds
]
≤ sup
(τ,A∗(Z))
EA∗(Z)
[∫ τ
0
e−δs sup
y≥0
{ϕ ◦ h−1 ◦ U(y)− y − bϕ,h,U}ds
]
≤ 0
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by definition of bϕ,h,U . Plugging the last inequality into (4.9), we obtain
v(0) ≤ b
ϕ,h,U
δ
+ sup
τ∈T
EA∗(Z)
[
e−δτ (−JCτ (0, R, τ, A∗(Z))−
bϕ,h,U
δ
)
]
. (4.10)
On the other hand, we have −JCτ (0, R, τ, A∗(Z)) ≤ 0 it yields that
− JCτ (0, R, τ, A∗(Z))−
bϕ,h,U
δ
≤ −b
ϕ,h,U
δ
. (4.11)
Case 1: if bϕ,h,U
δ
≥ 0, then − bϕ,h,U
δ
≤ 0, by (4.10) and (4.11) we have
v(0) ≤ bϕ,h,U
δ
= max( b
ϕ,h,U
δ
, 0).
Case 2: if bϕ,h,U
δ
< 0, then in this case − bϕ,h,U
δ
> 0, by (4.10) we get
v(0) ≤ b
ϕ,h,U
δ
+ sup
τ∈T
EA∗(Z)
[
e−δτ (−JCτ (0, R, τ, A∗(Z))−
bϕ,h,U
δ
)
]
≤ b
ϕ,h,U
δ
+ sup
τ∈T
EA∗(Z)
[−e−δτJCτ (0, R, τ, A∗(Z))]+ sup
τ∈T
EA∗(Z)
[
−e−δτ b
ϕ,h,U
δ
]
≤ b
ϕ,h,U
δ
+ sup
τ∈T
EA∗(Z)
[−e−δτJCτ (0, R, τ, A∗(Z))]− bϕ,h,Uδ
≤ 0 = max(b
ϕ,h,U
δ
, 0).
Therefore
v(0) ≤ max
{
1
δ
sup
y
{ϕ ◦ h−1 ◦ U(y)− y}, 0
}
.
This proves (4.6). •
4.2 Verification theorem
In order to provide the verification theorem, a first lemma shows that the public value function
satisfies a linear growth condition.
Lemma 4.2 There exists a positive constant K such that for all x ≥ 0, |v(x)| ≤ K(1 + |x|).
Proof: We fix x ≥ 0 and x′ ≥ 0. From (4.2), we have
|v(x)− v(x′)| ≤ sup
(R,τ,A∗(Z))∈Y
EA∗(Z)[e−δτ |JCτ (x,R, τ, A∗(Z))− JCτ (x′, R, τ, A∗(Z))|]
≤ K|x− x′|
where the last inequality is obtained thanks to the linear dependence in x of (e−λτJCτ (x,R, τ, A∗(Z)))
(see (4.1)). The result is proved since v(0) is finite. •
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Theorem 4.3 (Verification theorem) Let w ∈ C2(R+) satisfying a linear growth condition,
and we assume that
sup
(R,τ,A∗(Z))∈Y
E[|JCτ (x,R, τ, A∗(Z))|q] <∞ ∀q > 1. (4.12)
Then we have:
(i) For x ≥ 0, if w satisfies δw(x) ≥ sup
(r,a)∈R+×R+
{La,rw(x) + ϕ(a) − r} and w(x) ≥ −x, then
w(x) ≥ v(x).
(ii) Suppose that there exists two measurable non-negative functions (a∗, r∗) defined on (0,∞)
s.t.
sup
(r,a)∈R+×R+
{La,rw(x) + ϕ(a)− r} = La∗(x),r∗(x)w(x) + ϕ(a∗(x))− r∗(x), x ∈ (0,∞),
and that the SDE
dJCt =
(
λJCt − U(r∗(JCt )) + h(a∗(JCt )))− Zt
a∗(JCt )
σ
)
dt+ ZtdWt, J
C
0 = x
admits a unique solution ĴCt . We define
τ ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : w(ĴCt ) ≤ −ĴCt } (4.13)
and we assume that (r∗(ĴCt ), τ ∗, a∗(ĴCt )) lies in Y.
If w is a solution of (4.5) with boundary condition given by (4.6), then
(a) w = v, and τ ∗ is an optimal stopping time for the problem (4.2).
(b) The optimal rent is given by r∗(x) = (U ′)−1(− 1
w′(x))1w′(x)<0.
Proof:
(i) Let x ≥ 0 and n ∈ N, for an admissible contract (R, τ, A∗(Z)) ∈ Y , we denote
τn := τ ∧ inf{t : |w′(JCt (x,R, τ, A∗(Z)))σ
h′(A∗(Zt))
ϕ′(A∗(Zt))
1{A∗(Zt)>0}| ≥ n}.
Applying Itô’s formula to the process (e−δtw(JCt (x,R, τ, A∗(Z))))t≥0 between time 0 en τn and
using Proposition 3.5
w(x) = e−δτnw(JCτn(x,R, τ, A
∗(Z)))−
∫ τn
0
e−δs[−δw(JCs (x,R, τ, A∗(Z)))
+ LA∗(Zs),Rsw(JCs (x,R, τ, A∗(Z)))]ds
+
∫ τn
0
e−δsw′(JCs (x,R, τ, A
∗(Z)))σ
h′(A∗(Zs))
ϕ′(A∗(Zs))
1{A∗(Zs)>0}dW
A∗(Z)
s .
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Taking the expectation
w(x) = EA∗(Z)
[
e−δτnw(JCτn(x,R, τ, A
∗(Z)))−
∫ τn
0
e−δs[−δw(JCs (x,R, τ, A∗(Z)))
+ LA∗(Zs),Rsw(JCs (x,R, τ, A∗(Z)))]ds
]
≥ EA∗(Z)
[
e−δτnw(JCτn(x,R, τ, A
∗(Z))) +
∫ τn
0
e−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs)ds
]
= E
[
γA
∗(Z)
τn e
−δτnw(JCτn(x,R, τ, A
∗(Z))) + γA
∗(Z)
τn
∫ τn
0
e−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs)ds
]
where the inequality is obtained by using the assumption δw(x) ≥ sup
a,r
{La,rw(x) + ϕ(a) − r}
and the last equality is obtained by using the Bayes formula.
We fix p > 1, q1 > 1 and let q2 the conjugate of q1. We have
E
[
|γA∗(Z)τn
∫ τn
0
e−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs)ds|p
]
≤ E [|γA∗(Z)τn |pq1] 1q1 E [∫ τn
0
|e−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs)|pq2ds
] 1
q2
.
By using the definition of the set A and the integrability conditions on AC and AP ,
sup
n∈N
E
[
|γA∗(Z)τn
∫ τn
0
e−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs)ds|p
]
≤ C sup
τ∈T
E
[
(γA
∗(Z)
τ )
pq1
] 1
q1
(
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δs|ϕ(A∗(Zs))|pq2ds
] 1
q2
+ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δs(Rs)pq2ds
] 1
q2
)
< ∞.
So, we have sup
n∈N
E
[
|
∫ τn
0
γA
∗
s(Z)e−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs)ds|p
]
<∞, for p > 1, therefore
(
∫ τn
0
γ
A∗(Z)
s e−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs)) − Rs)ds)n∈N is uniformly integrable under P. This implies the con-
vergence in L1(P) (see Theorem A.1.2 in [17]) and we may pass to the limit as n→∞,
lim
n→∞
E
[∫ τn
0
γA
∗(Z)
s e
−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs)ds
]
= E
[∫ τ
0
γA
∗(Z)
s e
−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs)ds
]
. (4.14)
As w satisfies a linear growth condition, we have
E
[|γAτnw(JCτn(x,R, τ, A∗(Z)))|p] ≤ E [|γAτnK(1 + JCτn(x,R, τ, A∗(Z)))|p]
≤ KE [|γAτn + γAτnJCτn(x,R, τ, A∗(Z))|p]
≤ K
(
E[(γAτn)
p] + E
[|γAτn|pq1] 1q1 E [|JCτn(x,R, τ, A∗(Z))|pq2] 1q2 ) .
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K is a generic constant which could change from line to line. By using (4.12) and the integra-
bility conditions on A, we have
sup
n∈N
E
[|γA∗(Z)τn wJCτn(x,R, τ, A∗(Z))|p]
≤ K
(
sup
τ∈T
E
[
(γA
∗(Z)
τ )
p
]
+ sup
τ∈T
E
[
(γA
∗(Z)
τ )
pq1
] 1
q1 sup
(R,τ,A∗(Z))∈Y
E
[|JCτ (x,R, τ, A∗(Z))|pq2] 1q2
)
< ∞.
Then, we may pass to the limit as n→∞ and
lim
n→+∞
E
[
e−δτnγA
∗(Z)
τn w(J
C
τn(x,R, τ, A
∗(Z)))
]
= E
[
e−δτγA
∗(Z)
τ w(J
C
τ (x,R, τ, A
∗(Z)))
]
. (4.15)
By (4.14) and (4.15), we have
w(x) ≥ EA∗(Z)
[∫ τ
0
e−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs)ds+ e−δτw(JCτ (x,R, τ, A∗(Z)))
]
.
Since w(JCτ (x,R, τ, A∗(Z))) ≥ −JCτ (x,R, τ, A∗(Z)), this leads to
w(x) ≥ EA∗(Z)
[∫ τ
0
e−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs)ds− e−δτJCτ (x,R, τ, A∗(Z))
]
.
By taking the supremum, we obtain
w(x) ≥ sup
(R,τ,A∗(Z))∈Y
EA∗(Z)
[∫ τ
0
e−δs(ϕ(A∗(Zs))−Rs)ds− e−δτJCτ (x,R, τ, A∗(Z))
]
= v(x).
(ii)-a. We now consider the feedback control (r∗(ĴC), τ ∗, a∗(ĴC)) which is assumed to be in Y .
We denote
τn := τ
∗ ∧ inf{t : |w′(ĴCt )σ
h′(a∗(ĴCt )
ϕ′(a∗(ĴCt )
)1{a∗(ĴCt )>0}
| ≥ n}.
Observe that w(ĴCt ) > −ĴCt on [[0, τn[[ ⊂ [[0, τ ∗[[. Then on [[0, τn[[, by (4.5)
δw(ĴCt )− [La
∗(ĴCt ),r∗(ĴCt )w(ĴCt ) + ϕ(a
∗(ĴCt ))− r∗(ĴCt )] = 0.
Therefore
w(x) = Ea∗(ĴC)
[
e−δτnw(ĴCτn)−
∫ τn
0
e−δs
(− δw(ĴCs ) + La∗(ĴCs ),r∗(ĴCs )w(ĴCs ))ds]
= Ea∗(ĴC)
[
e−δτnw(ĴCτn) +
∫ τn
0
e−δs(ϕ(a∗(ĴCs ))− r∗(ĴCs ))ds
]
= E
[
e−δτnγa
∗(ĴC)
τn w(Ĵ
C
τn) + γ
a∗(ĴC)
τn
∫ τn
0
e−δs(ϕ(a∗(ĴCs ))− r∗(ĴCs ))ds
]
.
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Similarly to (i), we show that (
∫ τn
0
e−δsγa
∗(ĴC)
s (ϕ(a∗(ĴCs ))− r∗(ĴCs ))ds)n and
(
γ
a∗(ĴC)
τn w(ĴCτn)
)
n
are uniformly integrable under P. Passing to the limit as n → ∞, τn → τ ∗ a.s, and since
w(ĴCτ∗) = −ĴCτ∗ , we obtain
w(x) = Ea∗(ĴC)
[∫ τ∗
0
e−δs(ϕ(a∗(ĴCs ))− r∗(ĴCs ))ds− e−δτ
∗
ĴCτ∗
]
= JP0 (r
∗(ĴC), τ ∗, a∗(ĴC))
≤ v(x).
We conclude that w = v and (r∗(ĴC), τ ∗, a∗(ĴC)) is an optimal feedback control.
(ii)-b. For x fixed, we maximize the function
f(x, .) : r 7→ −w′(x)U(r)− r.
When w′(x) ≥ 0, the function f(x, .) is non-increasing and the optimum is achieved for r = 0.
Otherwise, the function f(x, .) is concave and the optimal rent is given by r∗(x) = arg maxr(f(x, r)).
Therefore
r∗(x) = (U ′)−1(
−1
w′(x)
)1w′(x)<0.
Furthermore, x→ r∗(x) is continuous even at zero points of the function w′ because (U ′)−1(∞) =
0. •
Remark 4.4 If we assume that the controls are in a bounded domain, then the value function
v is continuously differentiable on (0,∞[. This follows from Theorem 4 in [21], since the controls
are bounded, the uniform ellipticity condition is satisfied and the coefficients of the HJBVI (4.5)
are regular and Lipschitz.
5 Numerical study
We approximate numerically the solution of the HJBVI (4.5) by using a policy iteration algo-
rithm named Howard algorithm. The numerical approximation of the solution of (4.5) consists
in three steps:
1. Reduction to a bounded domain. We have to replace [0,∞) by a bounded domain [0, x].
Since the behavior of the HJB solution at ∞ is known, v(x) = −x for x large enough,
we propose this relevant artificial boundary condition. The choice of the boundary x is
empirical and the robustness is studied by varying x.
2. We use finite difference approximations to discretize the variational inequality (4.5).
3. We use Howard algorithm (see Howard [13]) to solve the discrete equation.
21
Figure 1: Optimal rent r∗ function of the effort a∗.
We detail Steps 2 and 3 in the Appendix.
For the following numerical implementation, we chose the following functions: ϕ(x) = 1 −
exp(−αx), h(x) = exp(βx)− 1 and U(x) = 1
2
x
3
4 ; α = 0.035 and β = 0.017.
In Figures 2–4 δ = 0.065, λ = 0.08 and σ varies: σ = 1.2, 1.65 or 2.2. We start from
v(0) = max
{
1
δ
supy≥0{ϕ ◦ h−1 ◦ U(y)− y}, 0
}
= 0.942. We take x = 10 and we plot the value
function, the optimal effort and the optimal rent in the continuation region.
According to Figure 1, it seems that the optimal rent is an increasing convex function of the
optimal effort.
22
Figure 2: Value function v for different σ.
Figure 3: Optimal effort a∗ for different σ.
Sensibility of the results to the parameter σ On Figure 1 the optimal public value
function v is increasing with respect to σ: the risk is supported by the consortium. The same
behaviour is observed for the optimal effort (Figure 3) and for the optimal rent (Figure 4) in
case of x large enough. The consortium is subject to volatility risk. We see that a significant
volatility crushes the impact of wealth: in this case, there is more risk for the consortium which
must make efforts even if the promised x is large enough. And if x is small, the consortium is
not ready to provide more effort (compared to a lower volatility). According to Figure 2, the
continuation region depends on volatility: the higher the volatility, the greater the continuation
23
Figure 4: Optimal rent r∗ for different σ.
region. The following table represents the continuation region Sc = {x ≥ 0 : v(x) > −x} for
different values of sigma σ
σ The continuation region Sc
1.2 [0, 3.66]
1.65 [0, 3.96]
2.2 [0, 4.66]
Table 1: Continuation region for different values of σ.
The following Figure 5 represents the function value on [0, x¯], for σ = 1.2 : the continuation
region is [0, 3.66] on which the value function is convex, it is then equal to minus the identity
function on the stopping region [3.66, x¯].
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Figure 5: The value function in [0, x¯].
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
We give the proof of the existence and uniqueness of a solution (Y, Z) to the BSDE (τ, ζ, g) in
S2(τ)×H2(τ)
Yt = ζ +
∫ τ
t
g(s, ω, Zs)ds−
∫ τ
t
ZsdWs
where τ is a fixed stopping time in T , ζ ∈ L2(Fτ ) and the generator g satisfies (H1) and (H2).
Step 1: Existence and uniqueness: Let z = (zs)s≥0 ∈ H2(τ) and we associate
Yt∧τ := E
[
ζ +
∫ τ
t∧τ
g(s, ω, zs)ds|Ft∧τ
]
. (6.1)
We have
E
[
ζ +
∫ τ
0
g(s, ω, zs)ds
]2
≤ E
[
|ζ|+
∫ τ
0
|g(s, ω, zs)|ds
]2
≤ E
[
|ζ|+
∫ τ
0
(|g(s, ω, 0)|+ c|zs|)ds
]2
≤ 3E[ζ]2 + 3E
[∫ τ
0
|g(s, ω, 0)|2ds
]
+ 3c2E
[∫ τ
0
|zs|2ds
]
,
where the second inequality follows from the contraction condition (H2). Then ‖z‖2H2(τ) < ∞
and (H1) imply that
E
[
ζ +
∫ τ
0
g(s, ω, zs)ds
]2
<∞.
By the martingale representation theorem, for all z ∈ H2(τ); there exists a unique Z ∈ H2(τ)
such that
E
[
ζ +
∫ τ
0
g(s, ω, zs)ds|Ft
]
= E
[
ζ +
∫ τ
0
g(s, ω, zs)ds
]
+
∫ t
0
ZsdWs, (6.2)
we can thus consider the application
H2(τ) → H2(τ)
z 7→ Φ(z) = Z.
Let us now prove that Φ is a contraction mapping with respect to the norm ‖.‖H2(τ). Let
(z1, z2) ∈ H2(τ)×H2(τ) such that Φ(z1) = Z1, Φ(z2) = Z2. We denote by:
Ŷ := Y 1 − Y 2, Ẑ := Z1 − Z2,
ẑ := z1 − z2, ĝt := g(t, ω, z1t )− g(t, ω, z2t ),
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where Y 1 and Y 2 are defined from (6.1).
From (6.2),
E
[∫ τ
0
ĝsds|Ft
]
= E
[∫ τ
0
ĝsds
]
+
∫ t
0
ẐsdWs,
we have
‖Ẑ‖2H2(τ) = E
[∫ τ
0
|Ẑs|2ds
]
= E
[(∫ τ
0
ẐsdWs
)2]
= E
[(
E
[∫ τ
0
ĝsds|Ft
]
− E
[∫ τ
0
ĝsds
])2]
= E
[(
E
[∫ τ
0
ĝsds|Ft
])2]
−
(
E
[∫ τ
0
ĝsds
])2
≤ E
[∫ τ
0
|ĝs|2ds
]
≤ c2E
[∫ τ
0
|ẑs|2ds
]
= c2‖ẑ‖2H2(τ).
As c < 1, Φ is a contraction mapping from H2(τ) to H2(τ), thus there exists a fixed point such
that Φ(Z) = Z and so there exists a unique solution (Y, Z) ∈ S2(τ)×H2(τ) solving the BSDE
(3.1).
Step 2: Comparison theorem: Let (Y, Z) (resp. (Y ′, Z ′)) the solution of the BSDE
(τ, ζ, g) (resp. BSDE (τ, ζ, g′)) with generators satisfying (H1) and (H2), and g(t, w, Zt) ≤
g′(t, w, Zt), t ∈ [[0, τ ]], dt⊗ dP a.e..
We fix θ > 0 which will be chosen later. Set ∆Y = Y − Y ′, ∆Y + = (Y − Y ′)1{Y >Y ′} and
∆Z = Z − Z ′. Since x 7→ x21x>0 is C2 a.e., by using generalized Itô’s formula (see [18]), we
obtain
eθτ (∆Y +τ )
2 − eθt(∆Y +t )2 =
∫ τ
t
θeθs(∆Y +s )
2ds +
∫ τ
t
2eθs∆Y +s
[
(g′(s, ω, Z ′s)− g(s, ω, Zs))ds+ (∆Zs)dWs
]
+
∫ τ
t
eθs(∆Zs)
21{Ys>Y ′s}ds. (6.3)
Since τ is finite, eθτ (∆Y +τ )2 = 0 P.a.s . The martingale
{∫ t
0
∆Y +s .∆ZsdWs, t ∈ [[0, τ ]]
}
is
uniformly integrable, indeed, by Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality, we have
E
[
sup
0≤t≤τ
∣∣ ∫ t
0
Ys.ZsdWs
∣∣] ≤ CE[(∫ τ
0
|Ys|2|Zs|2ds
) 1
2
]
≤ CE
[
sup
0≤s≤τ
|Ys|
(∫ τ
0
|Zs|2ds
) 1
2
]
.
Using ab ≤ a2
2
+ b
2
2
, we have
E
[
sup
0≤t≤τ
∣∣ ∫ t
0
Ys.ZsdWs
∣∣] ≤ C ′(E [ sup
0≤t≤τ
|Yt|2
]
+ E
[∫ τ
0
|Zs|2ds
])
.
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The last inequality is finite, since Y ∈ S2(τ) and Z ∈ H2(τ).
By taking the expectation of (6.3), we have
E
[
eθt(∆Y +t )
2
]
+ E
[∫ τ
t
eθs(∆Zs)
21{Ys>Y ′s}ds
]
+ E
[∫ τ
t
θeθs(∆Y +s )
2ds
]
= E
[∫ τ
t
2eθs(∆Y +s )(g(s, ω, Zs)− g′(s, ω, Z ′s))ds
]
. (6.4)
On the other hand, we get
2(∆Y +s )(g(s, ω, Zs)− g′(s, ω, Z ′s)) = 2(∆Y +s )
(
g(s, ω, Zs)− g′(s, ω, Zs) + g′(s, ω, Zs)− g′(s, ω, Z ′s)
)
≤ 2c|Ys − Y ′s |1{Ys>Y ′s}|Zs − Z ′s|
≤
(
c2(1 + ε)|Ys − Y ′s |21{Ys>Y ′s} +
|Zs − Z ′s|2
1 + ε
1{Ys>Y ′s}
)
, (6.5)
where the second inequality is obtained by using the contraction condition and (g(s, ω, Zs) −
g′(s, ω, Zs)) ≤ 0. And the last inequality is obtained by using 2ab ≤ a21+ε + (1 + ε)b2. Plugging
(6.5) into (6.4) and by choosing ε > 0 and θ > c2(1 + ε), we obtain
E
[
eθt(∆Y +t )
2
] ≤ 0.
Therefore, Ys ≤ Y ′s ,P a.s,∀s ∈ [[t, τ ]]. By continuity of Y and Y ′, we have Ys ≤ Y ′s , ∀s ∈
[[t, τ ]] P a.s.
•
6.2 Numerical algorithm
Finite difference approximations Let ∆ be the finite difference step on the state coordi-
nate and x∆ = (xi)i=1,N , xi = i∆, be the points of the grid Ω∆. The HJBVI (4.5) is discretized
by replacing the first and second derivatives of v with the following approximations
v′(x) '
{
v(x+∆)−v(x)
∆
if −λx− h(a) + U(r) ≥ 0
v(x)−v(x−∆)
∆
if not,
v′′(x) ' v(x+ ∆)− 2v(x) + v(x−∆)
∆2
,
v(0) = max
{
1
δ
sup
y≥0
{ϕ ◦ h−1 ◦ U(y)− y}, 0
}
,
v(x) = −x.
This leads to the system of (N − 1) equations with (N − 1) unknowns (v∆(xi))i=1,...N−1:
min
[
inf
(r,a)∈R+×∈R+
[A∆,(a,r)v∆(xi) +B
∆,(a,r)], v∆(xi) + xi
]
= 0 (6.6)
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where B4,(a,r) is given by
B4,(a,r) =

−ϕ(a) + r + (β−(∆)
∆
+ α(∆)
∆2
)v(0)
−ϕ(a) + r
...
−ϕ(a) + r
−ϕ(a) + r + (β+((N−1)∆)
∆
+ α((N−1)∆)
∆2
)v(x)

the tridiagonal matrix A∆,(a,r) is defined as follows
[A∆,(a,r)]i,i−1 =
β−(xi)
∆
+
α(xi)
∆2
; [A∆,(a,r)]i,i = γ(xi)−|β(xi)|
∆
−2α(xi)
∆2
; [A∆,(a,r)]i,i+1 =
β+(xi)
∆
+
α(xi)
∆2
;
with β+(x) = max(β(x), 0), β−(x) = max(−β(x), 0) and
γ(x) = δ,
β(x) = −λx− h(a) + U(r),
α(x) = −1
2
(
σh′(a)
ϕ′(a)
)21{a>0}.
The system of (N − 1) inequalities (6.6) can be solved by Howard’s algorithm. We describe
below this algorithm.
The Howard algorithm To solve equation (6.6), we use Howard’s algorithm. It consists in
computing iteratively two sequences ((an(xi), rn(xi))i=1,...N−1)n≥1 and ((v∆,n(xi))i=1,...N−1)n≥1
(starting from v∆,1) as follows:
• Step 2n− 1. v∆,n is associated a strategy
(an, rn) ∈ arg min
a,r
{
A∆,(a,r)v∆,n +B∆,(a,r)
}
.
• Step 2n. From the strategy (an, rn), we compute a partition (Dn1 ∪Dn2 ) of R+ defined by
A∆,(a
n,rn)v∆,n +B∆,(a
n,rn) ≤ v∆,n + x∆, on Dn1 ,
A∆,(a
n,rn)v∆,n +B∆,(a
n,rn) > v∆,n + x∆, on Dn2 .
The solution v∆,n+1 is obtained by solving two linear systems
A∆,(a
n,rn)v∆,n+1 +B∆,(a
n,rn) = 0, on Dn1 ,
and
v∆,n+1 + x∆ = 0, on Dn2 .
• If |v∆,n+1 − v∆,n| ≤ ε, stop, otherwise, go to step 2n+ 1.
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